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Scherr 1 
“I will keep them from harm and injustice… whatever houses I may visit, I will come for the 
benefit of the sick, remaining free of all intentional injustice.” — Oath of Hippocrates1 
 
I. Introduction 
During a 1927 speech at the annual meeting of the Association of American Medical 
Colleges, C.S. Butler, having recently finished his tenure as the Sanitary Engineer of Haiti, 
commented on the role of physicians in the American occupation of Haiti:  
We physicians have failed to appreciate the enormous importance of our calling in 
helping governments to confer the benefits of civilization upon backward races… When a 
physician cures the complaints of an individual, he nearly always captures the friendship 
of that individual at the same time. So it is with governments in relation to the masses.2 
The overarching tenet of medicine and the sworn mission of all physicians is to do no harm to 
the patient. Yet, such as all goals, the goal of medicine can sometimes become perverted. 
Doctors and patients do not exist in a vacuum, and thus all sickness and healing occurs within 
certain social, personal, and even political contexts. Yes, political. Desirable though it may be to 
separate health from politics, illness and death are ubiquitous to the human experience, and thus, 
treatment of the sick lies within the realm of social and political influence. Therefore, medicine 
is a tool that can be both wielded and shaped by politics. Various social and political factors can 
affect how, when, and for whose benefit medicine is practiced, and thus distort the humanitarian 
                                                
1 Peter Tyson, “The Hippocratic Oath Today,” NOVA, last modified March 27, 2001, accessed 
January 17, 2019, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/article/hippocratic-oath-today/. 
2 C.S. Butler, “Coordination of Medical Problems; Medical Education; Public Health and 
Hospitals in the Republic of Haiti,” Academic Medicine 3, no. 1 (1928): 48.	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purpose of medicine itself. Such was the case during the American occupation of Haiti from 
1915-1934. 
America opened the 20th century intent on controlling the Western hemisphere and 
assuming a role as a global economic power. This surge of American imperialism fed into the 
Spanish-American War at the turn of the century and subsequent U.S. efforts to maintain control 
of its territorial acquisitions in the Pacific and Caribbean. Throughout this period, the United 
States carefully sought to portray its expansionist aims as beneficent rather than imperial. After 
all, the nation’s ethos was one of liberty and democracy, and the advent of America itself was 
characterized by the overthrow of foreign colonial rule. Therefore, the United States attempted to 
convince the world—and itself—that American imperialism differed from the colonial endeavors 
of Old World powers. Economic expansion? No, this was democratic pioneering. Imperial 
conquest? Try humanitarian uplift. Thus, the United States painted itself as a physician come to 
cure a patient plagued by illness; by administering the medicines of democracy and capitalism, 
the backwards colonies could be saved from their literal and metaphorical diseases. 
Haiti was one such patient that fell under the “care” of the United States. Rife with 
political turmoil and saddled with debt to American investors, Haiti posed an opportunity for the 
U.S. to cure yet another blight in the Western hemisphere. Following the assassination of 
President Vilbrun Guillame Sam in 1915, the U.S. jumped at the chance to “save” Haiti. 
American troops—stationed just off the coast—immediately landed in Port-au-Prince and set 
about implementing the U.S. intervention in Haiti. For the next two decades, the Americans 
would prescribe whatever remedy they deemed necessary for Haiti. However, treatment of 
Haitian ills was compromised by the ulterior motives of the United States, and what was best for 
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American interests was misconstrued as being best for Haiti. By 1934, upon U.S. withdrawal 
from Haiti, the American intervention had left a complicated legacy of both harm and good. 
In analyzing the American occupation of Haiti, it is crucial to distinguish how the faux 
humanitarianism of the U.S. government impacted the genuine humanitarian goals of medicine. 
America was primarily interested in Haiti because it wished to preserve its political influence in 
the Western hemisphere and acquire Haiti as a new market for U.S. investors. However, the 
multitude of problems plaguing Haiti—including political instability, widespread poverty, and 
poor public health—allowed the U.S. to disguise its invasion as a humanitarian intervention. In 
reality, Haitian benefit was always of secondary concern to the U.S. government. While 
American politicians employed humanitarianism as a front for the occupation, American 
physicians genuinely sought to improve the well-being of the Haitian populace. Recognizing the 
positive impact that medicine could have on Haitian health, the American doctors set about 
treating disease—both physiological and cultural—as they saw fit. However, the imperialism of 
the occupation distorted the humanitarian goals of medicine in Haiti.  
The political objectives of the occupation meant that medicine was employed for a 
variety of purposes. First, medicine served as a means of protecting the American occupation 
force from disease and death in the tropics. Following the establishment of American control in 
Haiti, the function of medicine changed from a tool of pacification to a tool of propaganda. As 
the U.S. looked to justify its presence in Haiti, the American treatment of diseases such as 
malaria, yaws, and syphilis was held up as a bright spot of the occupation. U.S. doctors were not 
only improving the health of Haitian citizens, America argued, but also restoring the vitality of 
the country as a whole. However, the failure of occupation medicine to dramatically improve 
overall Haitian health subsequently cast doubt on the motives behind U.S. medical relief. Had 
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the Americans sincerely sought to improve the lives of Haitians, or had they simply wielded 
medicine as a political tool for their own benefit? The American occupation of Haiti highlighted 
the susceptibility of medicine to political aims, and left a blemish on the record of medical 
humanitarianism. The U.S. had entered Haiti preaching of a miracle cure, but left its “patient” 
perhaps worse off than before. 
 
II. Historiography 
Historians have been quick to decry the Americans’ stated humanitarian aims when 
invading Haiti. According to Hans Schmidt, “the immediate objectives of American expansion 
were to achieve hegemony in the Caribbean and the Pacific”—Haiti was no exception.3 
Throughout the late 1800s, the United States had been in competition with European powers for 
lucrative overseas trade routes and strategic military objectives, and the 19th century culminated 
with U.S. victory in the Spanish-American War. The resulting Treaty of Paris in 1898 brought 
the U.S. new territories in both the Pacific and the Caribbean, and the construction of the Panama 
Canal in 1914 officially linked the two regions of America’s imperial interests.4 Having 
established control over the Americas, the U.S. was keen on keeping Europe out of its 
transoceanic empire. The primary threat to U.S. influence in the Caribbean, according to 
Schmidt, was Germany. 5 With its powerful navy and an economic foothold in Haiti, Germany 
stood poised to capitalize on the instability of the Haitian state in 1915. Therefore, following 
President Sam’s assassination, the United States acted to preserve its Caribbean dominance by 
                                                
3 Hans Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934 (New Brunswick: Rutgers 
University Press, 1995), 4. 
4 Schmidt, 3-5. 
5 Schmidt, 4. 
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landing troops in Haiti. Contrary to characterizations of an American Open Door policy in the 
early 20th century, Schmidt claims that the occupation of Haiti demonstrated the Americans’ 
“closed-door, sphere of influence diplomacy.”6 
In addition to U.S. political interests, American economic involvement in Haiti also 
played a significant role in the decision to intervene. Jeffrey Sommers notes that “as early as 
1910, five years before the U.S. occupation of Haiti, United States banking interests obtained 
partial ownership of the National Bank of Haiti.”7 With American capital tied up in the Haitian 
bank, the U.S. was willing to forcefully intervene in order to protect American investments from 
the growing unrest in Haiti. According to Patricia J. Lopez, the Americans’ “big stick 
diplomacy” in Haiti built off the precedent set by Haitian-American relations of the 19th century. 
From 1849-1913, the U.S. had made a habit of sending troops into Haiti, intervening on over two 
dozen occasions.8 Leading up to the invasion of 1915, American involvement in Haiti had 
increased even further, with ten landings of U.S. troops in Haiti during 1914 alone.9 Lopez states 
that prior to the occupation, the U.S. was also interested in obtaining Haiti as a potential market 
for American landownership and railroad development.10 Thus, in the eyes of the U.S., Haiti was 
a fruit waiting to be plucked, and the instability of the Haitian state in 1915 provided the perfect 
excuse to expand into a new economic market. 
Most historians argue that racial paternalism also played a part in the United States’ 
blatant disregard for Haitian autonomy. Schmidt states that, in dealing with the Haitians, the 
                                                
6 Schmidt, 6. 
7 Jeffrey W. Sommers, “The U.S. Power Elite and the Political Economy of Haiti’s Occupation: 
Investment, Race, and World Order,” Journal of Haitian Studies 21, no. 2 (2015): 57. 
8 Lopez, 2243. 
9 Lopez, 2243. 
10 Patricia J. Lopez, “Clumsy Beginnings: From ‘Modernizing Mission’ to Humanitarianism in 
the U.S. Occupation of Haiti (1915-1934),” Environment and Planning A, 47 (2015): 2243-2244. 
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Americans believed them to be “inherently inferior,” and “approached [them] with ethnic and 
racial contempt.”11 In Taking Haiti, Mary Renda expands upon this idea, stating that paternalism 
was in fact the driving force of the occupation as a whole.12 U.S. Marines, Renda states, 
considered themselves father figures to the Haitians, and were convinced that the occupation was 
of great service to Haiti.13 In the words of Marine General Smedley Butler: “We were all 
[imbued] with the fact that we were the trustees of a huge estate that belonged to minors.”14 This 
characterization of the Haitians as incompetent minors stemmed from racist preconceptions in 
the United States. For example, the Secretary of the Navy, Josephus Daniels, compared the 
Haitians to the American “negroes in the South,” while Rear Admiral William Caperton, seeking 
to justify U.S. presence in Haiti, portrayed the people as dark cannibals in need of firm 
guidance.15,16 In this way, America established a clear power dynamic with Haiti. As father 
figure to the “orphaned nation,” the U.S. espoused concern for Haiti’s well-being, yet was 
justified in exercising authority over—and even disciplining—the smaller nation.17 Thus, when 
faced with the stark contradiction between the occupation of Haiti and the national values of 
freedom and democracy, paternalism—a veneer for racism—offered Americans a convenient 
explanation for the discrepancy. 
This discrepancy was on full display in the U.S. takeover of the Haitian government. 
Believing the Haitians to be incapable of self-government, the U.S. imposed the Haitian-
                                                
11 Schmidt, 10,15. 
12 Mary Renda, Taking Haiti: Military Occupation and the Culture of U.S. Imperialism, 1915-
1940 (Chapel Hill: University North Carolina Press, 2001), 15. 
13 Renda, 13. 
14 Renda, 13. 
15 Schmidt, 69. 
16 Sommers, 56. 
17 Renda, 15. 
Scherr 7 
American Treaty of 1915, which outlined a “partnership” between the two nations that condoned 
an American presence in Haiti until 1936. According to Schmidt, the treaty was morally and 
legally binding only at U.S. convenience; the Americans “frequently cited [the treaty] as 
justification for continuing the occupation,” that is until uprisings in Haiti prompted an early 
U.S. withdrawal in 1934.18 In the meantime, America operated without any regard for the Haitian 
democratic system, ramrodding the Haitian Constitution of 1918 into effect. The new 
constitution suspended the Haitian legislature, legalized American martial law, and—most 
symbolically—removed the ban on white, alien land ownership in Haiti (this law was a testament 
to the slave history of Haiti, and had been intended to preclude any future of white dominion 
over Haiti).19 When the Haitian government refused to ratify the constitution, the U.S. disbanded 
the legislature and appointed its own Council of State. The puppet government obediently 
installed the American-sponsored constitution, and was not assembled again until the occurrence 
of anti-American riots in 1929.20 
The paternalistic aims of the U.S. also meant that medicine, with its positive impact on 
individual health, proved to be a key symbolic component of the occupation. According to 
Antony Stewart in “An Imperial Laboratory,” Haiti had a reputation as a den of sickness and 
filth, contributing to the perception of its being a backwards nation. Thus, as the Americans 
entered Haiti, medicine offered an obvious means of uplifting the Haitians from their apparently 
substandard existence. 21 In addition to Stewart, many other historians have commented on the 
                                                
18 Schmidt, 11. 
19 Schmidt, 11. 
20 Schmidt, 11. 
21 Antony Dalziel McNeil Stewart, “An Imperial Laboratory: The Investigation and Treatment of 
Treponematoses in Occupied Haiti, 1915-1934,” História, Ciências, Saúde—Manguinhos 24, no. 
4 (2017): 1091-1092. 
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various functions of medicine during the occupation. Beyond basic improvements in health, 
historians have noted the Americans’ use of medicine to exert control over Haiti, pacify Haitian 
citizens, and justify the U.S. presence to the outside world.22 However, although the effect of 
medicine on the occupation has been acknowledged, the historiography fails to recognize the 
reciprocal effect that the occupation had on medicine. Indeed, U.S. motives in Haiti shaped the 
goals of medicine and how it was employed during the occupation. 
 
III. Medicine in the Hands of the Military 
In the beginning years of the occupation, medicine became a tool for conquest that was 
selectively practiced in accordance with U.S. objectives. In the hands of the military, medicine’s 
primary goals were: 1) to keep U.S. troops healthy; 2) to control and pacify the populace. 
Historically, the tropics had been considered the “white man’s graveyard”; in Haiti for example, 
yellow fever had ravaged both the French and British ranks during the Haitian Revolution. The 
U.S. was well aware of this history, and anxious not to repeat it.23 However, due to its forays into 
Panama, Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines, the U.S. had plenty of experience with tropical 
medicine prior to 1915. Having “[tamed] the tropics” previously, the Americans knew how to 
employ medicine strategically in Haiti.24 Thus, before the Marines even set foot on Haitian soil, 
medicine played a role in opening up Haiti for U.S. intervention. 
Once in Haiti, the occupation quickly became militarized. Despite easily establishing 
military control in Port-au-Prince and other coastal cities in 1915, U.S. forces were not received 
warmly by the Haitians. In urban areas, people would glare at the Marines and pour household 
                                                
22 Stewart, 1091-1093. 
23 Butler, “Coordination of Medical Problems,” 48. 
24 Stewart, 1092. 
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refuse onto American patrols that walked under their windows.25 Meanwhile, in the countryside, 
U.S. troops were opposed by Haitian guerilla forces, or cacos. Faced with hostility from the 
populace, Admiral Caperton admitted that the occupation began to be defined by military 
objectives, and “the ‘human’ in humanitarian was reduced to ‘combatant.’”26 Thus, from 1915-
1922, U.S. Marines set about eliminating rural pockets of resistance in a series of campaigns 
termed the First and Second Caco Wars. These “wars” proved extremely one-sided, as Haitian 
casualties totaled more than 2,000 dead by 1922, compared to only a couple dozen American 
dead.27 In addition to decimating the cacos, the American occupying force treated the Haitian 
citizenry with a marked degree of brutality. In 1919, Brigadier General George Barnett wrote to 
Colonel John H. Russell to complain about the “practically indiscriminate killing of natives” 
occurring in Haiti, eliciting an investigation into abuses by the Americans and Haitian 
gendarmes—Haitians conscripted into service with the U.S. military.28 Out of 52 cases later 
brought before a court of inquiry, only 18 were found to contain punishable offenses—the rest 
were dismissed as the “casualties of ‘savage warfare.’”29 
The Americans’ heavy-handed approach towards the Haitians also negatively impacted 
medical efforts in Haiti. First, medicine was rationed in favor of the American occupation force, 
and only practiced for the benefit of the Haitian populace when conducive to American military 
aims. This prioritization of American health over Haitian health was evident in an anti-malaria 
campaign conducted by naval medical officers in late 1922. Since arriving in Haiti, U.S. troops 
                                                
25 Schmidt, 68. 
26 Lopez, 2247. 
27 John J. Tierney, Jr., “America’s ‘Black Vietnam’: Haiti’s Cacos vs. The Marine Corps, 1915-
22,” Lincoln Review 2, no. 3 (1981): https://www.iwp.edu/news_publications/detail/americas-
black-vietnam-haitis-cacos-vs-the-marine-corps-1915-22. 
28 Lopez, 2246. 
29 Lopez, 2247. 
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had been hampered by a high frequency of malaria in their camps, despite the best efforts of the 
medical officers to sanitize the U.S. posts. For a seven-month period spanning from 1921-1922, 
687 cases of malaria were reported among the Americans—indicating a rate of nearly one case 
per soldier.30 The poor health of the Marines equated to exceedingly large treatment costs and 
decreased military efficiency, and thus prompted preventative efforts to treat malaria among the 
locals.31 Medical officers proceeded to treat Haitians living within a one mile radius of Marine 
posts with quinine; during the quininization campaign, the Marines reported only 237 cases of 
malaria over a seven-month period.32 Thus, the Americans treated the Haitians for disease, but 
“solely as a prophylactic measure for the [M]arines.”33 
In addition to preserving the health of the Americans, medicine also offered a means of 
stabilization and pacification. When the Americans seized Port-au-Prince in late July 1915, they 
discovered “a large population of sick and practically starving people” suffering amidst the chaos 
of the Haitian state.34 To compound the problem, the cacos cut off food supplies to urban areas in 
the hopes that the resulting food shortage would hinder the U.S. forces. Faced with a destitute 
population in need of food and medical care, the naval medical staff distributed food supplies 
and cared for the medical needs of transient individuals in Port-au-Prince.35 At face value, this 
was a humanitarian gesture to the conquered populace. However, had the Americans let the 
Haitians die of starvation and disease in the streets, they risked fueling further Haitian hatred and 
                                                
30 “Antimalaria Campaign Conducted in Haiti by Naval Medical Officers,” Public Health 
Reports (1896-1970) 38, no. 46 (1923): 2721. 
31 “Antimalaria Campaign Conducted in Haiti by Naval Medical Officers,” 2721-2723. 
32 “Antimalaria Campaign Conducted in Haiti by Naval Medical Officers,” 2722. 
33 “Antimalaria Campaign Conducted in Haiti by Naval Medical Officers,” 2722. 
34 Schmidt, 69. 
35 Schmidt, 69. 
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resistance towards the occupation, making the island nearly ungovernable. The U.S. would also 
have been compromising its identity as white savior to the poor, backwards nation.  
Although medicine proved to be a key tool for the military, lack of funding for 
widespread medical services demonstrated the ways in which the politics of the occupation 
interfered with medical work. Under the control of the military, healthcare in Haiti was clearly 
not a priority, as the Americans did not establish a Haitian public health service (Service 
d’Hygiène Publique) until 1917—two years after invading.36 In the meantime, Admiral Caperton 
had attempted to establish a sanitation program with a budget of $76,000;37 in contrast, the 
Americans set aside $3,000,000 of Haiti’s $8,000,000 yearly income to pay off Haitian debt to 
the U.S.38 Evidently, at the outset of the occupation, there was little impetus “to build up 
sanitation and public health beyond what would benefit U.S. troops.”39 Therefore, the medical 
budget from 1915-1917 merely provided for a street-sweeping service, minimal medicines and 
vaccines, medical treatment primarily for U.S. forces and the gendarmes, and the remodeling of 
some Haitian clinics and hospitals.40 Conditions improved in 1917 with the creation of the Public 
Health Service and the appointment of Norman McLean as Sanitary Engineer in Haiti. McLean 
set about organizing a public health system for Haiti and bolstered the medical budget to nearly 
$180,000, yet these improvements still proved inadequate considering the needs of the Haitian 
populace. With only five U.S. physicians and a handful of medically-trained corpsmen and 
gendarmes, McLean could only provide medical relief in urban districts—this only accounted for 
                                                
36 Lopez, 2245. 
37 Lopez, 2245. 
38 Butler, “Coordination of Medical Problems,” 53. 
39 Lopez, 2245. 
40 Lopez, 2245. 
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an estimated 5-10% of the Haitian population.41 Thus, not only did medicine function as a tool in 
the hands of the U.S. military, but its goals morphed from patient health and well-being to order 
and control via health. Under the supervision of the military, medicine was practiced selectively, 
normally in line with U.S. strategic objectives. 
 
IV. Reorganization of the Occupation 
Though successful in establishing order in Haiti, martial law did little to advance the 
condition of the populace, contrary to U.S. portrayals of the occupation. With World War I 
dominating news headlines from 1914-1918, the beginning years of the occupation passed 
largely unnoticed by the American people. In fact, from 1917-1918, the New York Times did not 
have a single entry regarding Haiti.42 Therefore, as the Wilson administration focused its 
attention on Europe, American policy in Haiti was left up to the discretion of U.S. personnel on 
the ground. Lacking clear policy directives from Washington, American civilian and military 
officials clashed over how to best govern Haiti.43 While the civilian advisors worked to 
restructure the Haitian government and operate according to the Haitian-American treaty, the 
Marines set about eliminating local resistance and establishing martial law. The resulting conflict 
among the occupation’s leaders rendered the American administration in Haiti ineffective and 
directionless, to the point where Wilson considered an American withdrawal in the aftermath of 
the Great War.44 In contrast with actual conditions on the ground, the news that reached the 
American public continued to paint a rosy image of the progress being made in Haiti. Thus, prior 
                                                
41 Lopez, 2245-2246. 
42 Schmidt, 109. 
43 Schmidt, 116. 
44 Schmidt, 118. 
Scherr 13 
to 1920, Americans largely supported the intervention, with vehement objections from only a 
few journals and publications.45 
However, following the outbreak of the Second Caco War in 1918, more journalists 
began to uncover the harsh U.S. treatment of the Haitians, prompting protests of the occupation 
back home. One of the most prominent accounts regarding the true nature of the occupation 
came from James W. Johnson of the NAACP, who visited Haiti in 1920. During his trip, Johnson 
met with Haitian elites and political activists, noting, “All the Haitians I talked to complained 
bitterly of conditions.”46 Meanwhile, Johnson found the Marines to be shockingly dismissive of 
the Haitians, with one saying, “The trouble with Haiti is that these n*****s down here with a 
little money and education think they are as good as we are.”47 When Johnson returned to the 
U.S., he proclaimed the oppression of the Haitians, sparking fierce public criticism of the newly-
exposed American imperialism in Haiti. However, Woodrow Wilson’s bid for reelection in 1920 
forced the president to double-down on the Americans’ commitment to the occupation. As U.S. 
atrocities in Haiti came into the public consciousness, the Republicans quickly acted to turn 
favor against Wilson during the election campaign, with Warren G. Harding denouncing the 
“rape of Haiti.”48 Popular approval thus swung against Wilson, as many Americans decried the 
irony of authoritarian rule in Haiti when considering Wilson’s Fourteen Points and calls for self-
determination at the conclusion of World War I. 
In response to the public outrage regarding American imperialism in Haiti, the Senate 
conducted an investigation of the occupation from the fall of 1921 to early 1922, led by 
                                                
45 Schmidt, 120. 
46 Johnson as quoted in McBride, 85. 
47 McBride, 86. 
48 Schmidt, 118-119. 
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Republican Senator Medill McCormick.49 In November 1921, McCormick’s committee visited 
Haiti, where they met with local Haitian elites and listened to various testimonies detailing 
atrocities committed by Americans during the occupation. Although the committee dismissed 
many accounts as inconsistent and untrustworthy, its final report reflected the need for change in 
the occupational administration; rather than withdrawing, McCormick and his fellow senators 
recommended the reorganization of American leadership in Haiti.50 According to McCormick, 
“We are there, and in my judgment we ought to stay there for 20 years.”51 By restructuring the 
administration, the U.S. hoped to bury claims of American brutality under a renewed narrative of 
humanitarianism in Haiti. As the U.S. worked to cast the occupation in a more humane light, 
medicine shifted its focus from conquering the Haitians to civilizing them instead. 
Based on the recommendations of the McCormick committee, the State Department 
ended martial law in Haiti and appointed a “High Commissioner” to oversee all aspects of the 
occupation. Despite the occupational reorganization, the Americans remained intent on 
maintaining control in Haiti, and thus kept the Marine garrison stationed on the island. In fact, by 
appointing a military officer as High Commissioner of the occupation, the U.S. clearly indicated 
that it had no interest in relinquishing power to the Haitians. The new appointee, General John H. 
Russell—a Marine commander in Haiti since 1917—was granted total control over civilian 
treaty officials in addition to the Marines and gendarmes, and served as the direct link between 
the U.S. State Department and the puppet Haitian government.52 Russell himself was a 
personification of the new policies he was tasked with implementing. Though he worked 
                                                
49 Schmidt, 121. 
50 Schmidt, 122. 
51 Schmidt, 122. 
52 Schmidt, 126. 
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tirelessly “in supporting progressive policies in educational and economic uplift… he did not 
hold the Haitians in high regard,” considering them more or less to be a mix of children and 
savages.53 Similarly, U.S. policies in Haiti would henceforth focus on material and social 
improvements in Haiti, with the purpose of civilizing what was deemed a backwards nation. 
Thus, Russell’s appointment as High Commissioner alleviated the tension between the dueling 
civilian and military components of the administration and was intended to signal the 
occupation’s transition from pacification to uplift. Whereas the early years of the occupation had 
focused on stabilizing the tumultuous nation and quelling resistance among the “natives,” the 
Americans now sought to bring the benefits of capitalism and civilization to Haiti. 
 Moving forward, medicine promised to play a key role in emphasizing the humanitarian 
aspects of the occupation and, therefore, American medical services in Haiti underwent a 
transition similar to that of the occupational administration. First, in 1923, the U.S. recruited the 
aid of the International Health Board (IHB) of the Rockefeller Foundation—a philanthropic 
organization—in improving Haitian health services. Throughout the early years of the 
occupation, members of the occupational administration had reached out to the IHB requesting 
their assistance in transforming conditions in Haiti.54 However, the IHB had repeatedly denied 
these requests, stating that they lacked the personnel necessary to add Haiti to their list of 
humanitarian projects.55 Finally, in 1923, following the urging of the U.S. State Department, the 
IHB agreed to assist with American public health efforts in Haiti.56 Henceforth, IHB 
representatives “conducted extensive health surveys and disease vector studies, along with a 
                                                
53 Schmidt, 124-125. 
54 Lopez, 2248. 
55 Lopez, 2248. 
56 Lopez, 2248. 
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survey of the medical education program.”57 On the one hand, the collaboration with the IHB 
served as a sound publicity move for the U.S. as it worked to restore the image of the occupation 
as a humanitarian endeavor. On the other hand, there were sincere hopes among American 
medical personnel that the Rockefeller Foundation’s involvement would ensure that medicine 
fulfilled its humanitarian objectives in Haiti.  
In conjunction with the Rockefeller Foundation’s recent involvement in Haiti, in 1924—
two years after the appointment of Russell as High Commissioner—Dr. C.S. Butler was named 
head of the Haitian Public Health Service.58 A naval medical officer who had served in the U.S. 
occupation of the Philippines, Butler arrived in Haiti prepared to revamp the nation’s sputtering 
public health program, and would serve as Sanitary Engineer in Haiti until 1927.59 As director of 
health services, Butler’s goal was to “turn over a public health machine, as perfect in type and as 
smooth in its running as it [was] possible to make” to the Haitians by the time the Americans 
withdrew.60 In addition to Butler’s appointment in 1924, the Americans—after gradually 
increasing medical funds in 1922 and 1923—significantly bolstered the Public Health Service’s 
budget, allowing Butler to add personnel and expand health services in Haiti.61,62 Armed with a 
robust budget and ample staff, Butler set about implementing the objectives of medicine under 
the reformed U.S. occupation. 
 
                                                
57 Lopez, 2248. 
58 Lopez, 2249. 
59 Stewart, 1096. 
60 Butler, “Coordination of Medical Problems,” 54. 
61 Stewart, 1098. 
62 C.S. Butler and E. Peterson, “The Public Health Service of Haiti: Its Origin, Organisation and 
Present System of Administration,” Rockefeller Foundation Records, 1.1.320. RG 1.1, 
Rockefeller Archive Center (1926): 5. 
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V. The Public Health Service and U.S. Medical Practice in Haiti  
Prior to Butler’s arrival in 1924, Haiti had been divided into three health districts in 1918—
north, south, and central—each with its own hospital, naval medical officer (physician), and 
chief pharmacist or chief pharmacist’s mate.63 In 1919, the establishment of the Public Health 
Service and the resulting boost in medical funds allowed for the construction of new hospitals 
and the further division of Haiti into nine districts. The larger regions—Port-au-Prince, Cap 
Haitien, Aux Cayes, and Jacmel—were overseen by a physician, whereas the smaller regions—
Saint Mare, Gonaives, Port-de-Paix, Petit Goave, and Jeremie—fell under the supervision of a 
pharmacist.64 Upon its expansion in 1924, the Public Health Service added a tenth district—
Hinche—and succeeded in staffing each region with a physician and assistant pharmacist.65 
Medical duties in the districts fell into two categories: hospital activities and sanitation work, 
supervised by physicians and pharmacists, respectively.66 Butler himself operated out of Port-au-
Prince—home to the main office of the Public Health Service and the Haitian General 
Hospital—with a physician and two chief pharmacists as his assistants.67 
The General Hospital in Port-au-Prince, being “modern and ideal in every way,” functioned 
as the epicenter of all medical work in Haiti.68 With 350 beds, the hospital had the capacity to 
treat nearly twice as many patients as the next largest district, Cap Haitien, with 200.69 The 
General Hospital held the most advanced treatment and diagnostic technologies, as well as the 
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most specialized medical services. For instance, while each hospital had its own small 
laboratory, the General Hospital housed the Central Public Health Laboratory of Haiti.70 It also 
was one of only three hospitals with an x-ray machine, and the only hospital with an eye, ear, 
nose, and throat department and specialist.71 Therefore, although other hospitals were able to 
offer general treatment to the patients of their districts, Port-au-Prince’s General Hospital offered 
the most advanced, comprehensive care in Haiti. However, the hospitals’ relatively urban 
locations made it difficult for the Public Health Service to reach the rural populace. 
In addition to geographical access, the Americans considered Haitian voodoo and 
traditional practices a major obstacle to their medical mission. According to Butler, most of the 
population believed in voodoo and trusted in priests and priestesses—“Papa Loi” and “Mama 
Loi”—for healing; convincing people whose “idea of preventive medicine [was] to tie a string 
with a bunch of [asaefoetida] attached to it around the neck” would prove difficult.72 Therefore, 
given the reluctance of rural Haitians to stray from traditional healing practices, the Public 
Health Service “[developed] an extensive rural clinic service” designed to “awake[n] the medical 
and hygienic conscience of the people.”73 In weekly and monthly intervals, the American 
physicians would set out into the countryside to treat the Haitian peasants at over 100 rural 
dispensaries scattered among the health districts.74 These clinics often drew hundreds of patients 
per visit, with two physicians reportedly having treated 950 Haitians on one occasion.75 
According to Butler, only town outcasts had visited the clinics initially, but as word spread 
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regarding the effectiveness of the Americans’ medicine, attendance exploded to nearly 35,000 
patients per month.76 While Butler himself admitted that the medicine being practiced en masse 
outside the hospital was not “medicine of the highest order,” he maintained that the Americans’ 
strategy of mass treatment was better than leaving the people to their own colloquial practices.77 
Encouraged by the success of the clinics, Butler and the Americans hoped that their practice of 
rural medicine would erode the influence of the “Papa” and “Mama Loi” and treat what they 
viewed as the Haitian “disease” of ignorance. To the Americans, the juxtaposition of Western 
medicine with Haitian voodoo reinforced the perception of Haitians as a backwards people and 
validated the notion that they required civilizing. Medicine therefore legitimized U.S. hegemony 
over the Haitians by emphasizing American superiority and portraying the Americans as white 
saviors curing Haiti of its cultural ills.  
This image manifested in a literal fashion, as the Americans set about treating the myriad of 
actual diseases plaguing Haiti. In “Haiti: An Experiment in Pragmatism,” Ulysses G. Weatherly 
cited American reports that “over 50 per cent [of Haitians were] afflicted with worms, at least 50 
per cent [were] tubercular, and more than a third [had] malaria.”78 In addition, the populace was 
plagued by dysentery, typhoid fever, leprosy, various water-borne pathogens, and a host of other 
diseases, resulting in a high morbidity rate that took a distinct toll on the Haitian population.79 
For instance, the American Marines were forced to lower the training standards for the Haitian 
gendarmerie due to the recruits’ poor physical stamina, and further medical examinations 
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revealed that “95% of [the recruits] had blood diseases and 85% had intestinal worms.”80 To 
combat a wide array of the pathologies afflicting Haiti, the Americans first addressed sanitation 
issues in Haitian cities. Newly-instituted street-sweeping services kept the cities relatively free of 
garbage, gendarmes went about ticketing citizens for health violations, such as basins of standing 
water or “improper nightsoil removal,” and the health service capped springs and chlorinated 
water supplies.81,82 To combat malaria specifically, the Americans: drained low-lying swamps or 
filled them with garbage or oil; cleared underbrush; utilized mosquito netting at night; and 
distributed quinine among U.S. Marines and some Haitian residents.83 According to Butler, the 
U.S. also established a “quarantine station, asylum for insane and a hospital for lepers.”84 As if to 
summarize the nation’s great public health push, Haiti ratified the Pan American Sanitary Code 
in 1926.85 
Among the spectrum of health issues facing Haiti, however, the primary disease target of 
American physicians was “yaws”—a close relative of syphilis that could be detected using the 
same blood test. Characterized by bone infections and painful skin lesions that could result in 
disfigurement and disability, yaws was the scourge of Haitian health when the U.S. invaded in 
1915.86 Yet at the outset of the occupation, the Americans had largely misdiagnosed yaws, 
conflating the Haitians’ skin lesions as signs of leprosy and tertiary syphilis.87 Physicians’ 
inability to cure leprosy at the time, coupled with the stigma surrounding sexually-transmitted 
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diseases such as syphilis, meant that yaws went largely untreated prior to Butler’s arrival in Haiti 
in 1924.88 While working in the Philippines, Butler had begun lumping yaws and syphilis 
together under a single diagnosis: “treponematosis.”89 Despite their distinct origins—yaws is a 
non-sexually-transmitted, rural disease prevalent in youth, whereas syphilis is a sexually-
transmitted disease that affects adult and urban populations—Butler cited the two diseases’ 
identical progression and treatment (arsenic therapy) as justification for their diagnostic 
association.90 Once in Haiti, Butler argued that the “innocent” yaws had been largely confused 
for its more scandalous cousin, syphilis.91 He thus advocated heavily for the treatment of both 
treponematoses in Haiti, which he estimated as affecting approximately 70% of Haitians 
throughout their lifetime.92 As the Public Health Service began to diagnose and treat 
treponematosis via arsenic therapy, the disease proved to be extremely prevalent, with the Port-
au-Prince rural clinic reporting 3274 cases in July 1926—64% of the clinic’s patient volume.93 
Therefore, under Butler’s leadership, the Americans significantly expanded the reach of 
medicine and public health in Haiti. All in all, U.S. efforts to improve Haitian public health were 
quite extensive, and “were often highlighted by even the most [skeptical] observers.”94 
Nonetheless, the efficacy of U.S. medicine in Haiti was frequently overblown, as evidenced 
by the smallpox epidemic of 1920. According to Butler, this outbreak infected about 60% of the 
Haitian populace and prompted the newly-formed Public Health Service to initiate a vaccination 
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campaign.95 The Americans reportedly vaccinated between 850,000 and 900,000 Haitians, 
crowing that only vaccinated Haitians had avoided contracting smallpox.96 In this way, the 
Americans cast themselves as valiant defenders of Haitian health, a rosy characterization at best. 
In fact, U.S. officials had failed to enforce mandatory vaccination laws prior to the 1920 
outbreak, and the manner in which smallpox tore through the country highlighted the 
shortcomings of American public health efforts in Haiti.97 While the vaccination campaign had 
indeed succeeded in reaching an impressive number of Haitians, the Americans conveniently 
glossed over the less flattering details of the epidemic. This evidenced American tendencies to 
propagandize medical work in Haiti, as well as the progress of the occupation as a whole.98 
 
VI. Justification and Uplift Through Medicine 
Although the reorganization of the occupation had placed an increased emphasis on Haitian 
public health, the benevolent veneer of the occupation was belied by its racist undertones, which 
subsequently caused the racialization of medicine in Haiti. Occupational racism largely stemmed 
from the attitudes of U.S. leadership in Haiti, as many officials had roots in the American culture 
and institutions of Jim Crow. Admiral William B. Caperton was a “child of the Civil War South” 
who believed the intervention was “liberal and fair” given the supposed inferiority of Haitian 
government and culture.99 Meanwhile, High Commissioner John Russell, originally from 
Georgia, supported racial segregation and privately considered most of the Haitian populace to 
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be “bordering on a state of savagery.”100 Woodrow Wilson himself was a Southerner deeply 
shaped by the racial ideology of the Jim Crow era. Therefore, in subordinating the Haitians, the 
U.S. drew on a number of racist, black stereotypes. Comparing the American and Haitian 
“negroes,” Charles Chapman characterized the Haitian as “more subdued, simple, and well-
mannered” than the American, yet with a “far greater burden to throw off before he can take his 
place among the civilized peoples of the earth.”101 Considering Haiti to be the equivalent of a 
“happy-go-lucky” child, the Americans assumed a racially paternalistic attitude towards the 
Haitians that manifested in a number of ways.102 Primarily, the Americans deemed the Haitians 
incapable of operating their own country, and thus the grounds that had served to justify the 
invasion of 1915 also established the racial hierarchy of the occupation. During the occupation, 
white Americans held all positions of ultimate authority, originating in the office of the High 
Commissioner and disseminating into the lower ranks of the administration.103 In the 
gendarmerie, not a single Haitian advanced past the white Marine officers in rank, and only five 
Haitians had been promoted to the rank of captain by 1929.104 The Americans also conferred 
special treatment to the lighter-skinned, elite mulatto class of Haiti, installing them as puppet 
rulers.105 
Medicine itself also served to further entrench occupational racism. In the Public Health 
Service, all the hospitals were run by white naval medical officers, while Haitian doctors, nurses, 
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and technicians—comprising a majority of the staff—assumed subordinate positions and carried 
out menial tasks. Racism also played a factor in the American reluctance to treat syphilitic 
patients in Haiti. Prior to C.S. Butler’s categorization of yaws and syphilis under the same 
diagnosis, treponematosis, all patients infected with Treponema were diagnosed as syphilitic.106 
This played into “derisive, longstanding stereotypes of uncontrolled black promiscuity,” and 
rationalized American refusals to treat the Haitians for syphilis due to the supposedly 
“insurmountable biological and cultural defects among Haitian society.”107 Thus, racist 
ideologies caused American physicians to view their Haitian patients as subhuman, and fed into 
the perceived “moral obligation of the white races… to assist [the] little Caribbean republic to 
her feet.”108 Haiti symbolized not only the white man’s burden, but more specifically, the 
physician’s burden as well. 
The racial paternalism of the occupation meant that, even following occupational reform, the 
humanitarian vision of medicine in Haiti remained tarnished. Namely, medicine’s primary goals 
in the latter half of the occupation were: 1) to revive the Haitian economy by improving the 
health of individual Haitians; 2) to civilize the Haitians; 3) most importantly, to justify the 
continued American presence in Haiti. With regards to U.S. capitalist aims, C.S. Butler himself 
advertised medicine as the remedy to Haiti’s economic woes, stating:  
By elevating the standard of health, [the government] increases the earning capacity of the 
laborers… [E]xperience… in the Caribbean… and western Tropics shows that it is best for 
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generals of commerce and industry, as well as for military generals to ‘purchase this big 
thing from the physician.’109 
Butler’s statement made evident the aims of the restructured U.S. occupation. Following the 
reorganization of the administration in Haiti in the early 1920s, it soon became clear that the 
occupation’s focus had simply shifted from military conquest to economic uplift. In 1927, for 
example, the United States continued to exert total control over Haitian finances, funneling $2.68 
million—$1 million more than necessary—towards paying off Haitian debt to U.S.-based 
creditors.110 In comparison, public health received only $0.68 million of the Haitian budget, 
indicating that health remained less of a priority than U.S. economic interests in Haiti.111 
Therefore, the economic motives of the U.S. occupation meant that increased medical outreach 
was mainly for the purpose of keeping Haitian workers healthy and improving Haitian 
agricultural productivity.112 As the U.S. sought to revitalize the Haitian economy, medicine 
transitioned from treating Haitians as combatants to treating them as the means of production. 
In addition to improving the Haitian economy, the U.S. saw medicine as a means of raising 
the Haitians from their seemingly uncultured, ignorant existence. According to Hans Schmidt, 
“Americans, as representatives of an advanced, modern, industrialized nation, felt that they could 
transform backward, underdeveloped Haiti with American technology and practical 
ingenuity.”113 These sentiments were espoused by Ulysses B. Weatherly, who in his article, 
“Haiti: An Experiment in Pragmatism,” insisted that “intelligent guidance from without may 
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sometimes accelerate the process of national growth and save much waste.”114 American disdain 
for Haitian capabilities applied to medicine as well, with C.S. Butler remarking: “With politics in 
such a shocking condition… what could we expect from [Haiti] for medical education or 
sanitation or for hospitals…?”115 In the eyes of Butler, “from 1804 to 1915, the medical side of 
Haiti’s story [was] not long to tell,” and America had “a moral obligation… of rendering to 
backward peoples… much-needed medical assistance.”116 
In order to bestow the “gift” of Western medicine upon the Haitians, Butler and the 
Americans considered a modern medical education system of chief importance in Haiti.117 
Towards this aim, in 1926, the Haitian government allocated $50,000 for the construction of a 
new medical school in Port-au-Prince. The medical school would initially be run by the naval 
medical officers, who would train classes of 15-20 Haitian medical students over a period of four 
years, after which they would complete a one-year internship.118 To ensure a high quality 
education for the Haitian students, the Americans secured an extra $30,000—three yearly 
installments of $10,000 —from the Rockefeller Foundation to furnish the school with new 
medical equipment.119,120 Finally, the Rockefeller Foundation also provided Haitian doctors with 
fellowship opportunities in the United States and Europe in order to enhance their training.121 
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Although of undeniable benefit to the Haitians, the emphasis on improved medical education 
did not spring from a place of beneficence on the part of the Americans, but rather of necessity. 
Indeed, up until the late 1920s, the Haitians had operated solely as subordinates to the American 
physicians—this was due in large part to the Americans’ racist preconceptions regarding the 
competence of Haitian medical personnel.122 For instance, when K.C. Melhorn called the Dean 
of the Haitian Medical School into his office to brief him on the intricacies of the Public Health 
Service’s budget, “the Dean’s eyes ‘fairly bugged out’ for… ‘he had not realized all the other 
elements entering into the Sanitary budget.’”123 Therefore, had the deadline for the American 
withdrawal from Haiti not been fast-approaching, the Americans would likely never have 
considered fully training Haitian physicians. However, facing the imminent U.S. withdrawal, the 
Americans had no choice but to pass the reigns of their public health machine to the Haitians and 
hope that “the foundations for a Haitian medical personnel… [would] be able to carry on 
according to the plans laid down by their American friends.”124 
The primary function of medicine in the later years of the occupation, however, was to 
legitimize American control over Haiti. Following reports of U.S. Marine brutality in the early 
years of the occupation, the Americans were desperate for favorable propaganda surrounding 
their presence in Haiti; medicine provided them with the perfect justification.125 Richard Parsons 
raved that “the yaws work [stood] out as the most glowing chapter of all Haitian medicine… 
because of its tremendous accomplishments for the human and economic betterment of Haiti.”126 
Dr. Elwood Mead, after visiting Haiti in 1926, marveled at how the Public Health Service had 
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succeeded in bringing “the benefits of modern medical science and sanitation” to the Haitians, 
stating, “Today Port-au-Prince is as clean and sanitary as Washington.”127 Thus, medicine 
portrayed the Americans not only as benevolent, but infallible, and blame for any shortcomings 
of the occupation landed squarely on Haitian shoulders. For instance, when American attempts to 
eradicate yaws in 1929 failed, it was due to the “ignorance of the people.”128 Similarly, concerns 
regarding the ability of Haitian nurses in Port-au-Prince stemmed from their lack of initiative and 
responsibility, not poor instruction.129 Thus, medicine fed into U.S. propaganda regarding the 
occupation, and served to vindicate the takeover of Haiti by erasing American ineptitudes. 
 
VII. U.S. Withdrawal and Fallout 
As the U.S. occupation wore on, however, it became increasingly difficult to ignore the 
growing discontent in Haiti. Contrary to U.S. public portrayals of the occupation, many Haitians 
had always resented the Americans running their country, and the puppet administrations 
installed by the Americans relied heavily on U.S. military might to keep them in power. For 
example, in 1915, the newly-established president, Sudre Dartiguenave, lasted a mere month 
before the U.S. felt it necessary to impose martial law in Haiti.130 Backed by the U.S., 
Dartiguenave remained as president until 1922, when he refused to authorize the consolidation of 
Haitian debt in the U.S.-owned Banque Nationale—a move that practically sold Haiti’s “soul” to 
U.S. creditors.131 Over the years, Dartiguenave had grown resistant to U.S. objectives in Haiti, 
                                                
127 Department of the Interior Memorandum for the Press, September 13, 1926, Rockefeller 
Archive Center (Sleepy Hollow, New York), 4. 
128 McBride, 97. 
129 Excerpts from Richard M. Pearce’s Diary of His Trip to Haiti. 
130 Schmidt, 74. 
131 Schmidt, 127-128. 
Scherr 29 
and therefore the Americans made sure Dartiguenave’s replacement, Louis Borno, would be 
more amenable to U.S. demands. Borno—who admired the Italian fascist leader, Benito 
Mussolini—was a proponent of U.S. authoritarian uplift in Haiti and a willing participant in the 
Americans’ anti-democratic machinations.132 However, Borno’s continued refusal to assemble 
the Haitian Council of State and thus allow for presidential elections prompted student strikes in 
1929, which soon developed into full-fledged riots by the political opposition.133 Faced with 
growing tensions in Haiti, the Americans ousted Borno and conveniently sidestepped the 
electoral provisions of the Haitian Constitution to pronounce Eugene Roy—a candidate agreed 
upon by both Haitian parties—as the interim president.134 While the immediate collapse of the 
occupation was avoided, the political unrest of 1929 marked the beginning of the end of the U.S. 
occupation. 
By 1930, Haiti had ceased to be worth the headache it was causing the Americans, and the 
U.S. began a slow exit from the island nation. With Europe no longer a threat to its hegemony in 
the Western hemisphere and the Great Depression’s devastating effect on the domestic economy, 
the U.S. had little interest in running a small Caribbean nation chafing against American 
authority. Unwilling to remain in Haiti until 1936—per the stipulations of the 1915 Haitian-
American Treaty—yet recognizing that a hasty retreat would destabilize Haiti and reflect poorly 
upon the U.S., the Americans opted for a prolonged withdrawal.135 When the last remaining 
Marine detachment left Haiti in August 1934, the Americans spun their departure as “a positive 
affirmation of the new Good Neighbor Policy in Latin America,” not an unceremonious 
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retreat.136 While the Americans pronounced their intervention a success, upon closer 
examination, the supposed benefits of the American occupation in Haiti could scarcely be found. 
While in Haiti, the Americans had controlled nearly all aspects of the occupation, leaving the 
Haitian government and civilian professionals starved of experience and education.137 Following 
the American withdrawal, the Haitian government found itself further indebted to foreign 
creditors, Haitian technology lagged behind that of other Latin American nations, and a vast 
majority of the Haitian populace remained impoverished, unhealthy, and uneducated.138 Thus, 
after nearly two decades of atrophy under U.S. rule, Haitian government and society struggled to 
operate effectively. 
The abysmal fallout of the American intervention in Haiti subsequently brought the legacy of 
occupation medicine into question. Had the Haitians actually benefitted from American aid? In 
the aftermath of the occupation, the Americans proudly proclaimed that U.S. medicine had 
treated droves of Haitians for disease and made massive improvements to the Haitian public 
health system. However, during the slow U.S. transition out of Haiti, “the health systems 
infrastructure was slowly dismantled— the budget was slashed, prescriptions were watered 
down, and Haitians were expected to pay for or provide their own bandages and oils, by order of 
the Sanitation Engineer.”139 America’s callous exit exposed occupation medicine as no more 
than a travelling clinic, gone as fast as it had come. In the meantime, Haiti was still mired in 
disease and left unprepared to treat itself. “Haitian medical personnel had been starved of 
experience for nearly two decades,” and were unable to adequately address Haiti’s daunting 
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public health challenges following the U.S. withdrawal.140 American medicine thus caused Haiti 
to become increasingly reliant on foreign medical aid in the aftermath of the U.S. occupation. 
Although medicine addressed many of the immediate health issues facing Haiti, it failed to 
provide for the long-term health of its Haitian “patient.” 
 
VIII. Conclusion 
The U.S. occupation of Haiti demonstrated the susceptibility of medicine to political and 
social aims. As the U.S. sought to control Haiti in the early years of the occupation, American 
military and political objectives led to the selective practice of medicine on behalf of the 
Haitians. Medicine looked to stabilize Haiti by fostering an environment in which the American 
military could operate, and as a result, the Haitians were often viewed as combatants rather than 
patients. Once the brutal martial law imposed by the Americans was no longer acceptable in the 
public eye, medicine worked to cast the occupation in a more humane light. However, the lenses 
of racism and economic uplift distorted medicine’s view of the Haitians, reducing patients to 
little more than ignorant children and the economic means of production. Nevertheless, the 
treatment of disease and development of public health infrastructure in Haiti served as wonderful 
propaganda for the Americans, who highlighted medicine as a primary justification for the 
continued U.S. presence in Haiti. Ultimately, once the Americans lost interest in the Haitian 
project, the beneficent hand of American medicine was quickly retracted, and the Haitians were 
left perhaps worse off than before. Thus, the politics of the U.S. occupation drastically affected 
the goals of medicine and how it was practiced in Haiti. From the occupation, we can see that 
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medicine in and of itself is not inherently good. Rather, it depends upon the context in which it is 
practiced and the aims that it serves.  
C.S. Butler was correct in saying, “We physicians have failed to appreciate the enormous 
importance of our calling in helping [government].”141 However, he failed to recognize the 
reciprocal impact that government had on him and his fellow physicians. 
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